Husserl, the mathematization of nature, and the informational reconstruction of quantum theory

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Husserl, the mathematization of nature, and the informational reconstruction of quantum theory Philipp Berghofer1   · Philip Goyal2 · Harald A. Wiltsche3 Accepted: 16 November 2020 © The Author(s) 2020

Abstract As is well known, the late Husserl warned against the dangers of reifying and objec‑ tifying the mathematical models that operate at the heart of our physical theories. Although Husserl’s worries were mainly directed at Galilean physics, the first aim of our paper is to show that many of his critical arguments are no less relevant today. By addressing the formalism and current interpretations of quantum theory, we illus‑ trate how topics surrounding the mathematization of nature come to the fore natu‑ rally. Our second aim is to consider the program of reconstructing quantum theory, a program that currently enjoys popularity in the field of quantum foundations. We will conclude by arguing that, seen from this vantage point, certain insights deliv‑ ered by phenomenology and quantum theory regarding perspectivity are remarkably concordant. Our overall hope with this paper is to show that there is much room for mutual learning between phenomenology and modern physics. Keywords  Phenomenology · Philosophy of physics · Quantum theory · Informational reconstruction of quantum theory · Mathematization · Edmund Husserl · The Crisis of European sciences

* Philipp Berghofer philipp.berghofer@uni‑graz.at Philip Goyal [email protected] https://www.philipgoyal.org Harald A. Wiltsche [email protected] 1

Department of Philosophy, University of Graz, Graz, Austria

2

Department of Physics, University at Albany (SUNY), Albany, NY, USA

3

Department of Culture and Society (IKOS), Unit for Philosophy and Applied Ethics, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden



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1 Introduction It is no overstatement to say that Husserl’s last major publication The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology is a key text in twentieth century philosophy of science. In it, Husserl offers a thorough analysis of what he consid‑ ered to be a deeply-rooted “crisis of our culture and the role here ascribed to the sciences.”1 Part of this crisis is that science has lost touch with the realities of the proverbial “man on the street” and thus fails to answer the most pressing questions, “questions of the meaning and meaninglessness of the whole of [...] human exist‑ ence.”2 It is crucial to see, however, that Husserl’s criticism amounts to much more than a general lament about practical, cultural, political, and existential-philosophi‑ cal issues surrounding modern scientific culture. On Husserl’s view, the crisis diag‑ nosed by him is rather a direct consequence of our theoretical inability to come up with a single, coherent, and philosophically satisfying interpretation of the kind of scientific theorizing that followed the pioneering works of seventeenth century revo‑ lutionaries such as Galileo Galilei or Isaac Newton. Instrumental to the overall argu‑ ment in the Crisis is w