In Defense of Love Internalism
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In Defense of Love Internalism D. Justin Coates
Received: 7 November 2012 / Accepted: 4 April 2013 / Published online: 14 May 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
Abstract In recent defenses of moral responsibility skepticism, which is the view that no human agents are morally responsible for their actions or character, a number of theorists have argued against Peter Strawson’s (and others’) claim that ‘‘the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to feel reciprocally, for each other’’ would be undermined if we were not morally responsible agents. Among them, Derk Pereboom (Living without free will. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, Ideas y Valores 141:5–25, 2009) and Tamler Sommers (Philos Q 57(28):321–342, 2007, Relative justice: cultural diversity, free will, and moral responsibility. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2012) most forcefully argue against this conception of love. However, in this paper, I plan to defend the claim that there is an essential connection between love and moral responsibility, a thesis I will call love internalism. To begin, I will specify the content and scope of love internalism, and consider ways in which other theorists have attempted to motivate it. I will then consider the various arguments that Pereboom and Sommers advance against love internalism. These arguments, it seems to me, offer us powerful reasons to reject several of the ways in which philosophers have tried to connect moral responsibility to love. Consequently, in light of these criticisms, I will further precisify the content of love internalism. And as we will see, love internalism (as I argue for it) is immune to Pereboom’s and Sommers’ criticisms. Moreover, when its content is sufficiently clarified, love internalism can serve as a plausible premise in an anti-skeptical argument. I thus conclude by arguing that this suitably reformulated statement of love internalism offers a significant challenge to moral responsibility skepticism of the sort Pereboom and Sommers endorse. Keywords Moral responsibility Love Moral responsibility skepticism P. F. Strawson D. J. Coates (&) Law and Philosophy Fellow, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA e-mail: [email protected]
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D. J. Coates
Destroy love and friendship; what remains in the world worth accepting? *David Hume1 1 Introduction In recent defenses of moral responsibility skepticism, which is the view that no human agents are morally responsible for their actions or character, a number of theorists have argued against Peter Strawson’s (and others’) claim that ‘‘the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to feel reciprocally, for each other’’ would be undermined if we were not morally responsible agents (Strawson 1962/ 2003, 79).2 Among them, Pereboom (2001, 2009) and Sommers (2007, 2012) most forcefully argue against this conception of love. However, in this paper, I plan to defend the claim that there is an essential connection between love and moral responsibility, a thesis I will call love
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