Key Features of Enrichment & Reprocessing Plants
Uranium enrichment is an essential part of the light water reactors (LWRs), advanced gas-cooled reactors (AGRs) and high-temperature reactors (HTRs) fuel cycle. Of these, the LWRs are most widely used. However, the uranium enrichment process has been the
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1 Introduction Uranium enrichment is an essential part of the light water reactors (LWRs), advanced gas-cooled reactors (AGRs) and high-temperature reactors (HTRs) fuel cycle. Of these, the LWRs are most widely used. However, the uranium enrichment process has been the only part of the nuclear fuel cycle that has been kept under strict secrecy and control. The reasons are obvious. It can be seen from Figure 1 that the five nuclear weapons states have used uranium235 (U-235) in their first fusion devices and three weapons states, including the two new ones, have used U-235 in their first fission bombs. While highly enriched U-235 has been used to start the fusion reaction in the thermonuclear weapons, Pu-239 would also trigger such a reaction. Should a country decide to start its nuclear weapons (fission weapon) programme with U-235 as the fissile material, then the acquisition of an enrichment facility becomes essential. The uranium for a nuclear weapon is enriched to at least 50 per cent and it is generally assumed that the fissile material used by nuclear weapon powers in their uranium weapons contains uranium enriched to at least 90 per cent. Several methods for isotope separation were known even before nuclear fission was discovered. The aim of enrichment is to increase the proportion of fissile U-235 atoms within uranium. The most common methods are the gaseous diffusion and centrifuge processes. Two other technologies that are proliferation-prone are the jet nozzle process developed in Germany and the advanced vortex tube process that was patented in the United States in 1968 and developed further by South Africa. While both these are proliferationprone since, among other things, they require a lower level of technology and are therefore attractive to countries less technologically developed, they may be difficult to monitor by satellite based remote sensing. The availability of a variety of lasers has now made laser isotope separation possible. Theoretically it is possible to achieve a very high degree of separation of uranium isotopes in a single step with low energy consumption. The process has been demonstrated on a laboratory scale. It has been estimated that the B. Jasani et al. (eds.), International Safeguards and Satellite Imagery DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79132-4_7, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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B. Jasani
Fission devices
Fusion devices
Country
Year of first explosion/bomb production
Fissile material
Source of fissile material
Year of first explosion
Fissile material
Source of fissile material
USA
16 July 1945
Pu-239
Reactor
U-235
Gaseous diffusion
USSR
29 August 1949
Pu-239
Reactor
U-235
UK
3 October 1952
Pu-239
Reactor
France
13 February 1960
Pu-239
Reactor
1 November 1952 12 August 1953 28 April 1958 24 August 1968
Gaseous diffusion Gaseous diffusion Gaseous diffusion
China
16 October 1964
U-235
Gaseous diffusion
17 June 1967
U-235
Gaseous diffusion
Israel
Late 1966
Pu-239
Reactor
-
-
-
India
18 May 1974
Pu-239
Reactor
-
-
-
Sout
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