Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution of multiple degrees of freedom of a single photon
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Front. Phys. 16(1), 11501 (2021)
Research article Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution of multiple degrees of freedom of a single photon Yu-Fei Yan1 , Lan Zhou2 , Wei Zhong1,3 , Yu-Bo Sheng1,3,† 1
Institute of Quantum Information and Technology, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003, China 2 Schoool of Science, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003, China 3 Key Lab of Broadband Wireless Communication and Sensor Network Technology, Ministry of Education, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003, China Corresponding author. E-mail: † [email protected] Received July 20, 2020; accepted August 22, 2020
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) provides us a powerful approach to resist all attacks at detection side. Besides the unconditional security, people also seek for high key generation rate, but MDI-QKD has relatively low key generation rate. In this paper, we provide an efficient approach to increase the key generation rate of MDI-QKD by adopting multiple degrees of freedom (DOFs) of single photons to generate keys. Compared with other high-dimension MDI-QKD protocols encoding in one DOF, our protocol is more flexible, for our protocol generating keys in independent subsystems and the detection failure or error in a DOF not affecting the information encoding in other DOFs. Based on above features, our MDI-QKD protocol may have potential application in future quantum communication field. Keywords measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution, polarization, longitudinal-momentum, key generation rate
1 Introduction Since the Bennett–Brassard-1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol [1] was proposed, quantum secure communication based on QKD has experienced a long-term development, which has become an interesting research area in both theory and experiment [2–16]. Throughout the whole development process of QKD, there are always struggle between attack and anti-attack strategies, which focus on the discrepancy between perfect theory and practice [17]. Although QKD is absolutely secure in theory, in reality, due to the imperfect measurement devices and quantum signal source, QKD system cannot guarantee the unconditional security of keys in practical condition. For example, practical photon detectors are vulnerable to various types of attacks such as the time-shift attacks [18–20], detection blinding attacks [21], beam-splitter attack [22, 23] and fate-stack attacks [24, 25]. In addition, eavesdroppers can also take use of imperfect quantum signal sources to perform attack [26, 27], such as the photon-number-splitting (PNS) ∗ arXiv:
2009.09555. This article can also be found at http://journal.hep.com.cn/fop/EN/10.1007/s11467-0201005-1.
attack [28]. The problem from PNS attack can be solved by the decoy state method [29–32]. In 2007, Acín group first put forward the deviceindependent QKD (DI-QKD) protocol [33]. DI-QKD does not require detailed knowledge of how device
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