Twin-field quantum key distribution with heralded single photon source
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THE EUROPEAN PHYSICAL JOURNAL D
Regular Article
Twin-field quantum key distribution with heralded single photon source Fen Zhou1 , Wenxiu Qu1 , Jipeng Wang1 , Tianqi Dou1 , Zhenhua Li1 , Shunyu Yang1 , Zhongqi Sun1 , Guoxing Miao2 , and Haiqiang Ma1,2,a 1
2
School of Science, State Key Laboratory of Information Photonics and Optical Communications, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, P.R. China Institute for Quantum Computing, Department of Chemistry, Department of Physics and Astronomy, and Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1, Canada Received 15 April 2020 / Received in final form 24 July 2020 / Accepted 14 August 2020 Published online 17 September 2020 c EDP Sciences / Societ`
a Italiana di Fisica / Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature, 2020 Abstract. The recently proposed twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) effectively overcomes the key capacity limitation without quantum relay and achieves long-distance quantum key distribution. In this paper, based on the TF-QKD protocol by Lucamarini et al. [M. Lucamarini, Z.L. Yuan, J.F. Dynes, A.J. Shields, Nature 557, 400 (2018)], we propose a scheme where the weak coherent state (WCS) is replaced by a heralded single photon source (HSPS), and compare their performance by calculating the key rate. The numerical simulation results show that TF-QKD using HSPS can still break through the rate-distance limitation. Specifically, compared with the WCS TF-QKD protocol, the HSPS TF-QKD protocol has a lower secret key rate but a greater distance. Thus we show the TF-QKD with HSPS is a more preferable protocol for long distance transmittance.
1 Introduction Quantum key distribution uses the the basic principles of quantum physics to complete the unconditional secure key distribution. Since the first QKD protocol, BB84 protocol, was proposed in 1984 [1], different kinds of QKD protocols have been proposed and developed constantly in recent decades. The two legitimate sites of key distribution are usually named as Alice and Bob. Alice transmits the key to Bob through a quantum channel. Of course, there may be an untrusted third-party Eve in the transmission process, who can exploit the vulnerability of the actual devices to commit eavesdropping or attacks by various means [2–4]. The security threats mainly come from two aspects: the imperfections of the single photon sources [5–7] and the loopholes of the equipment, especially imperfections in the detectors [8–12]. For imperfect light sources, Eve can commit photon number splitting attack [7], and the proposition of decoy state theory solves the light source security threat [13]. Eavesdropper (Eve) cannot distinguish between a decoy state and a signal state when the two states share the same wavelength, timing, and other physical properties. Furthermore, the improved decoy protocol significantly improves the security and transmission distance, therefore the feasibility of QKD systems [14,15]. For the loophol
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