Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt
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Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt Silvan Wittwer1
Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract Recently, companions in guilt strategies have garnered significant philosophical attention as a response to arguments for moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and that our moral beliefs are thus systematically mistaken. According to Cuneo (The normative web: an argument for moral realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), Das (Philos Q 66:152–160, 2016; Australas J Philos 95(1):58–69, 2017), Rowland (J Ethics Soc Philos 7(1):1–24, 2012; Philos Q 66:161–171, 2016) and others, epistemic facts would be just as metaphysically problematic (or ‘guilty’) as moral facts. But since epistemic error theory is implausible, arguments for moral error theory prove too much and should be rejected. My aim is to argue that the success of this strategy is limited. In particular, the companions in guilt response fails against error-theoretic arguments motivated by concerns about explanatory dispensability, as recently developed by Joyce (The evolution of morality, MIT press, Bradford, 2005) and Olson (Moral error theory: history, critique, defence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014: Ch. 7). To succeed, the response would require a prima facie plausible argument to the effect that epistemic facts are metaphysically dubious because they, too, are explanatorily dispensable. But, as I show, any such argument proves self-effacing: its premise commits us to believing in epistemic facts, while its conclusion forces us to deny their existence. Consequently, companions in guilt strategies don’t offer a panacea against arguments for moral error theory. Keywords Moral error theory Companions in guilt Epistemic reasons Explanatory dispensability Evolutionary debunking
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S. Wittwer
1 Introduction Moral error theory is the view that there are no moral facts and that our moral beliefs are thus systematically mistaken. In response to arguments for this view, critics such as Cuneo (2007), Das (2016, 2017), and Rowland (2012, 2016) have recently turned towards companions in guilt strategies. According to their strategy, epistemic facts would be just as metaphysically problematic (or ‘guilty’) as moral facts. But, they contend, epistemic error theory is implausible. So, arguments for moral error theory seem to prove too much and should be rejected. Companions in guilt strategies might be effective against error-theoretic worries about the categoricity or irreducibility of the normative. However, my aim is to argue that such strategies don’t offer a panacea against arguments for moral error theory. In particular, their success doesn’t translate to error-theoretic arguments motivated by concerns about explanatory dispensability, as recently developed by Joyce (2005) and Olson (2014: Ch. 7). This is because, on reflection, explanatory dispensability seems problemati
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