Philosophy and Neuroscience A Ruthlessly Reductive Account

Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account is the first book-length treatment of philosophical issues and implications in current cellular and molecular neuroscience. John Bickle articulates a philosophical justification for investigating

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Studies in Brain and Mind Volume 2

Series Editors ' John W. Bickle , University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio Kenneth J. Sufka , University of Mississippi, Oxford, Mississippi

Philosophy and N euroscience A Ruthlessly Reductive Account

by

John Bickle University of Cincinnati, U.S.A.

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bickle, Jobn. Philosophy and neuroscience: a ruthlessly reductive account / by John Bickle. p. ; crn. -- (Studies in brain and rnind ; 2) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4020-1302-7 ISBN 978-94-010-0237-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-010-0237-0 1. Neurosciences--Philosophy. 1. Title. Il. Series. [DNLM: 1. Psychophysiology. 2. Mind-Body Relations (Metaphysics) 3. Neuroscience. 4. Philosophy. 5. Psychologica1 Theory. WL 103 B583p 2003] RC343.B43 2003 612.8'01--dc21 2003040140 ISBN 978-1-4020-1302-7

Printed on acid-free paper

AlI Rights Reserved © 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2003 Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 2003 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permis sion from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

To Marica To Caroline, Kat, and Margaret Family

"And yet, there are philosophers who refuse to acknowledge scientific philosophy as a philosophy, who wish to incorporate its results into an introductory chapter of science and claim that there exists an independent philosophy, which has no concern with scientific research and has direct access to truth. Such claims, I think, reveal a lack of critical judgment. Those who do not see the errors of traditional philosophy do not want to renounce its methods or results and prefer to go on along a path which scientific philosophy has abandoned. They reserve the name of philosophy for their fallacious attempts at a superscientific knowledge and refuse to accept as philosophical a method of analysis designed after the patterns of scientific inquiry. What is required for a scientific philosophy is a reorientation of philosophic desires." --Hans Reichenbach (1957), The Rise ofScientific Philosophy, 305.

CONTENTS

Preface Chapter One: From New Wave Reduction to New Wave Metascience 1. Why Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience? 2. Background: The Intertheortic Reduction Reformulation of the Mind-Body Problem 3. Revolts Against Nagel's Account 3.1 "Radical" Empiricism (and Patrick Suppes) 3.2 Schaffner's General Reduction (-Replacement) Paradigm 3.3 Hooker's General Theory of Reduction 4. Extending Hooker' s Insight: New Wave Reduction 4.1 Handling Multiple Realizability 4.2 New Wave Reduction 5. WWSD? (What Would Socrates Do?) 5.1 Problems for New Wave Reductionism 5.2 New Wa