Bare-Difference Methodology and a Problematic Separability Principle
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Bare‑Difference Methodology and a Problematic Separability Principle Zak A. Kopeikin1
© Springer Nature B.V. 2019
1 Introduction According to philosophers who embrace the dominant view of bare-difference methodology, this argument form provides a useful and powerful tool in ethics. James Rachels coined the term ‘bare-difference argument’ for a method of reasoning in applied ethics, and this style of argumentation is prominent in the killing and letting die literature.1 The methodology has been challenged, defended, and examined critically.2 Still, it is generally accepted, being highlighted as one of the argumentative tools for applied ethicists.3 1
See James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 292, No. 9, (28): pp. 78–80. For examples of discussion in the killing and letting die literature, see Winston Nesbitt, “Is Killing No Worse than Letting Die?,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 1, (19): pp. 101–106; Roy Perrett, “Killing, Letting Die and the Bare Difference Argument,” Bioethics, Vol. 10, No. 1, (26): pp. 131–139; Michael Tooley, “An Irrelevant Consideration: Killing versus Letting Die,” in Bonnie Steinbock, ed., Killing and Letting Die (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 30), pp. 56–62. 2 For challenges of bare-difference methodology, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Killing, Letting Die, and The Trolley Problem,” The Monist, Vol. 59, No. 2, (29): pp. 204–217; Frances Kamm, Morality, Morality: Volume II: Rights, Duties and Status (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 12); Shelly Kagan, “The Additive Fallacy,” Ethics, Vol. 99, No. 1, (11): 5–31; Frances Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 13).For defenses of the methodology, see Heide Malm, “In Defense of the Contrast Strategy,” in John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, eds., Ethics: Problems and Principles (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 18), pp. 272–277; Perrett, op. cit., pp. 101–106; Duncan Purves, “Still in Hot Water: Doing, Allowing, and Rachels’ Bathtub Cases,” Southwest Philosophy Review, Vol. 27, No. 1, (27): pp. 129–137. For critical examination of the axiological principles underlying the methodology, see Graham Oddie, “Killing and Letting-Die: Bare Differences and Clear Differences,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 88, No. 3, (22): pp. 267–287; Graham Oddie, “Axiological Atomism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 3, (23): pp. 313–332; Graham Oddie, “Recombinant Values,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 106, No. 3, (24): pp. 259–292. 3 See David Boonin and Graham Oddie, What’s Wrong? Applied Ethicists and Their Critics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1), pp. 12–16.
* Zak A. Kopeikin [email protected] 1
Philosophy Department, University of Colorado, Boulder, Hellems 169 UCB 232, Boulder, CO 80309‑0232, USA
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Z. A. Kopeikin
Though the bare-difference methodology has been used mainly in applied ethics, Oddie has shown that it is applicable more br
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