Belief, credence, and evidence
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Belief, credence, and evidence Elizabeth Jackson1 Received: 29 March 2018 / Accepted: 25 September 2018 © Springer Nature B.V. 2018
Abstract I explore how rational belief and rational credence relate to evidence. I begin by looking at three cases where rational belief and credence seem to respond differently to evidence: cases of naked statistical evidence, lotteries, and hedged assertions. I consider an explanation for these cases, namely, that one ought not form beliefs on the basis of statistical evidence alone, and raise worries for this view. Then, I suggest another view that explains how belief and credence relate to evidence. My view focuses on the possibilities that the evidence makes salient. I argue that this makes better sense of the difference between rational credence and rational belief than other accounts. Keywords Belief · Credence · Evidence · Rationality · Lottery paradox · Statistical evidence · Salience
1 Introduction A topic of recent interest in epistemology is the relationship between belief and credence.1 Here, my interest is in questions about how belief and credence relate to different types of evidence. While most of our evidence is both belief-generating and credence-generating, it has been suggested that certain types of evidence ought to affect one’s credences more than one’s beliefs.2 In this paper, I explore this suggestion further and look more closely at the relationship between belief, credence, and evidence.
1 See Jackson (forthcoming ) for why the relationship between belief and credence is an important epistea mological question. 2 Buchak (2014), Staffel (2015), Smith (2010).
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Elizabeth Jackson [email protected] Dept of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, 100 Malloy Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA
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I focus on three cases: cases of naked statistical evidence,3 lottery cases,4 and hedged assertions, with an eye toward seeking a unified explanation of these cases. These cases are unique in that they seem to be credence-generating but not beliefgenerating; they seem to be cases where rational agents ought to raise their credence in some proposition but not believe it. Why would this be? Why does some evidence affect our credences rather than our beliefs? These are the questions I will explore. My primary aim is not to argue that these cases are ones that are credence-justifying but not belief-justifying. Rather, it is to convince the reader who is already sympathetic to my verdicts about the cases that I can explain them better than other accounts. I proceed as follows. In Sect. 2, I cover relevant background material. In Sect. 3, I describe the three cases I seek to elucidate. In Sect. 4, I consider a potential explanation for these cases that has been suggested in the literature, that one ought not form beliefs on the basis of mere statistical evidence, and argue it is insufficient. In Sect. 5, I provide my own account of what is going on in these cases. My account centrally involves the possibilities a piece of evidence makes salient. I argue for my accou
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