Coalition Formation and Social Choice
Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, domina
- PDF / 19,559,028 Bytes
- 248 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 35 Downloads / 267 Views
THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY General Editors: W. Leinfellner (Vienna) and G. Eberlein (Munich) Series A: Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences Series B: Mathematical and Statistical Methods Series C: Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research
SERIES C: GAME THEORY, MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH VOLUME 19 Editor: So Ho Tijs (University of Tilburg); Editorial Board: EoE.C. van Damme (Tilburg), H. Keiding (Copenhagen), J.-F. Mertens (Louvain-Ia-Neuve), H. Moulin (Durham), S. Muto (Tohoku University), T. Parthasarathy (New Delhi), B. Peleg (Jerusalem), H. Peters (Maastricht), T. E. S. Raghavan (Chicago), J. Rosenmiiller (Bielefeld), A. Roth (Pittsburgh), D. Schmeidler (Tel-Aviv), Ro Selten (Bonn), W. Thomson (Rochester, NY). Scope: Particular attention is paid in this series to game theory and operations research, their formal aspects and their applications to economic, political and social sciences as well as to socio-biology. It will encourage high standards in the application of game-theoretical methods to individual and social decision making.
The titles published in this series are listed at the end ofthis volume.
COALITION FORMATION AND SOCIAL CHOICE by AD M.A. VAN DEEMEN University ofNijmegen
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-1-4419-4781-9 ISBN 978-1-4757-2578-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-4757-2578-0
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved ©1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1997 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1997 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner
CONTENTS
1
PREFACE
ix
INTRODUCTION
1 1 2
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
2
The Relevance of Political Coalition Formation The Game-Theoretic Study of Political Coalition Formation Problems in the Game-Theoretic Study of Coalition Formation Simple Games and Social Choice Purpose Plan of the Book
FUNDAMENTALS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Social States 2.3 Individuals and Coalitions 2.4 Preference and Choice 2.5 Preference Profiles 2.6 Social Choice Rules 2.7 Collective Rationality and Social Choice 2.8 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem 2.9 Social Choice: The Functional Approach
3
EXAMPLES OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES 3.1 3.2 3.3
Introduction The System of Majority Decision The Plurality Rule v
6 8 11
12
17 17
18 20 21 26 28 31 33 42 47 47 48 75
3.4 The Borda Rule 3.5 The Dutch Electoral System
4
GENERAL SOLUTIONS FOR SOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEMS 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7
5
COALITION FORMATION IN SIMPLE GAMES 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9
6
Introduction Mathematical Preliminaries Maximal Social Choices The Theory of Generalized Optimal Choices Von Neumann-Morgens
Data Loading...
