Contingency and Freedom Lectura I 39
During the seventies, there was a revival of systematic philosophy in general and of ontology in particular. At the same time, especially in Anglo-Saxon thinking, systematic philosophy interacted very creatively with the history of medieval philosophy. It
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The New Synthese Historical Library Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy VOLUME 42
Series Editor: NORMAN KRETZMANN, Cornell University
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JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
CONTINGENCY AND
FREEDOM Lectura 139
Introduction, Translation and Commentary
by
A. VOS JACZN. H. VELDHUIS A. H. LOOMAN-GRAASKAMP E. DEKKER N.W.DENBOK Research Group John Duns Scotus, Franciscan Study Centre at the Catholic University of Utrecht, and the Theological Faculty of Utrecht Universtity
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Duns Scotus, John, ca. 1266-1308. [Lectura. I 39. English & Latin) Contingency and freedom = Lectura I 39 / John Duns Scotus ; introduction, translation, and commentary by A. Vos Jaczn ..•. ret a I. l. p. cm. -- !. Scotus will maintain that God has determinate knowledge even of the future (§§ 62-66). 1
The first argument is derived from Aristotle's Perihermeneias 9 (De interpretatione 9), in which the nature of the future is discussed. According to Aristotle only the future is contingent. What then must be said about a proposition (P) about the future? It does not bear any truthvalue according to the Aristotelian theory of propositions about the future: it is neither true nor false. If p does not bear any truth-value (and therefore is indeterminate), p cannot be known either. So God cannot have any knowledge bearing truth-value about the future and therefore He does not have any knowledge at all about the future.
2
The second argument entwines some important concepts. Aristotle says that, if a proposition concerning the future were determinate, negotiations or deliberations would be useless. If an intellect holds certain knowledge of the future, consultation becomes redundant.
1 'Determinate' ('determinata') does not have any causal, physical or logically-necessary meaning. Cf. 'determining' in a biological context: establishing an object's gender or kind.
45
Et hoc confirmatur per rationem Phi los 0 phi, quia si in iBis esset veritas determinata, «non oporteret negotiari neque consiliari»b; igitur apud nullum intellectum est certa cognitio de contingentibus.
3
Furthermore, one component
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