Counterfactuals versus conceivability as a guide to modal knowledge
- PDF / 331,590 Bytes
- 23 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 19 Downloads / 184 Views
Counterfactuals versus conceivability as a guide to modal knowledge Daniel Dohrn1
Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract I compare two prominent approaches to knowledge of metaphysical modality, the more traditional approach via conceiving viz. imagining a scenario and a more recent approach via counterfactual reasoning. In particular, Timothy Williamson has claimed that the proper context for a modal exercise of imagination is a counterfactual supposition. I critically assess this claim, arguing that a purely conceivability/imaginability-based approach has a key advantage compared to a counterfactual-based one. It can take on board Williamson’s insights about the structure of modal imagination while avoiding aspects of counterfactual reasoning which are orthogonal to figuring out metaphysical modality. In assessing whether A is possible, we creatively devise test scenarios, psychologically and metaphysically apt A-scenarios, which manifest the relevant metaphysical requirements and test them for their compatibility with A. In this exercise, imagination is subject to implicit constraints as Williamson has it, but it is not bound to drawing consequences from minimally altering actuality such as to make room for A. Keywords Modal epistemology Modal Modal knowledge Possible Necessary Counterfactual Imagination Imagining Conceiving Conceivability Williamson
I shall compare two views which even their detractors often regard as ‘the leading current accounts of modal epistemology: the conceivability and counterfactual accounts’(Jago forthcoming). I focus on questions of possibility and leave necessity & Daniel Dohrn [email protected] 1
Dipartimento di Filosofia, Universita` degli Studi di Milano, Via Festa del Perdono 7, 20122 Milan, Italy
123
D. Dohrn
for future work. I shall only discuss the most prominent version of the counterfactual-based account due to Timothy Williamson (2007).1 As contrasted to ‘counterfactual-based’, I reserve ‘conceivability-based’ for an approach in which the specific counterfactuals Williamson has in mind do not play a distinctive role. I use ‘imagination-deploying’ to address the conceivability- and the counterfactualbased account together. In concentrating on Williamson, I limit the scope of my argument by making a presupposition that is shared by Williamson and proponents of conceivability-based approaches like Yablo (1993, 2) and Chalmers (2002): the task is to figure out a canonical (unique and general) method which allows us to attain any knowledge of metaphysical possibility within human reach. The presupposition may be made explicit: if there is a canonical method, what is the most promising candidate? The availability of such a canonical method is compatible with there being other, less comprehensive methods to arrive at modal claims. I shall not discuss theories like Kment’s (2014; forthcoming) who assigns counterfactuals a limited role in proceeding from one possibility claim to another. My argument does not preclude such a limited use of counterfactual
Data Loading...
