Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market
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Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market Russell Keat Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, 220pp. ISBN: 0-333-69225-X. Contemporary Political Theory (2002) 1, 389–391. doi:10.1057/palgrave.cpt.9300047
When is it legitimate to protect a good from market forces? Russell Keat explores this question, motivated partly by his unease at the introduction of market principles into cultural institutions such as broadcasting, education and the arts. In this context, the issue is not essentially one of distributive justice but concerns instead the proper limits of the market in a good society. The book is divided into two parts, reflecting a change of mind (if not heart) the author has undergone: the first part argues that the market is inherently incompatible with the proper organization and conduct of the activities which produce cultural goods, whilst the second backtracks, arguing that the market need not corrupt the activities which produce these goods though it may lead to their being under-supplied. The first part of the book gives a central role to Alasdair MacIntyre’s conception of a practice, understood as a form of cooperative activity that is governed by its own internal standards and which is essential for the production of particular goods. Like MacIntyre, Keat regards practices as important sources of well-being for those who participate in them. He develops MacIntyre’s account in an illuminating manner by identifying an important way in which practices, and the institutions that sustain them, provide their participants with appropriate recognition for the contributions they make within these practices. The desire for such recognition is often a significant source of motivation for participants, though a practice can be distorted or corrupted if engaging in it comes to be viewed as merely a means to recognition. Keat is sympathetic to MacIntyre’s view that the market is inherently hostile to practices. Again he develops MacIntyre’s account, this time employing the concept of consumer sovereignty. Consumers are ascribed sovereignty in the market not only in the sense that the market in effect gives their demands priority over the desires and interests of producers but also in the sense that they are often regarded as arbiters of what is of value. In this way, the market sets up an alternative source of ‘authority’ to that contained within practices. Practices may be distorted or corrupted as a result of being governed by the market, for if they are to survive in the face of market forces they may have to adjust their own standards to meet the demands of consumers. As Keat rightly
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argues, there need be nothing objectionably elitist about insisting that the superior judgement of practitioners should prevail even if that requires reining in the market. In the second part of the book, Keat backs away from the strong claim that the flourishing of practices is inherently incompatible with the market, arguing for the more nuanced conclusion that whether it is incompatible depends (amongst other things) o
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