Evolution of Mobile Strategies in Social Dilemma Games: An Analysis of Cooperative Cluster Formation
This paper analyses the formation of cooperative clusters toward the emergence of cooperative clusters in evolutionary spatial game theory. In the model considered, agents inhabit a toroidal lattice grid, in which they participate in a social dilemma game
- PDF / 752,105 Bytes
- 17 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 20 Downloads / 166 Views
Abstract This paper analyses the formation of cooperative clusters toward the emergence of cooperative clusters in evolutionary spatial game theory. In the model considered, agents inhabit a toroidal lattice grid, in which they participate in a social dilemma games, and have the ability to move in response to environmental stimuli. In particular, using the classical 2-player prisoner’s dilemma and a generalised N-player prisoner’s dilemma, we compare and contrast the evolved movement strategies, and the cooperative clusters formed therein. Additionally, we explore the effect of varying agent density on the evolution of cooperation, cluster formation, and the movement strategies that are evolved for both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies.
1 Introduction Questions relating to cooperation and its emergence have been studied in a range of domains including economics, psychology, theoretical biology, and computer science. Researchers have explored the conditions necessary for cooperation to emerge among groups or societies of self-interested agents. Social dilemma games, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma [1], have been adopted as a succinct representation of the conflict between individually selfish behaviours and collectively rational behaviours. Evolutionary game theory has been studied since the 1980s when ideas from evolutionary theory were incorporated into game theory [2]. A variety of social dilemmas have been studied with the majority of attention afforded to the 2-player prisoner’s dilemma. Many variations of this game exist, which allow researchers to explore questions regarding cooperation in the presence M. D. Gibbons (B) · C. O’Riordan · J. Griffith National University of Ireland, Galway, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] C. O’Riordan e-mail: [email protected] J. Griffith e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 J. J. Merelo et al. (eds.), Computational Intelligence, Studies in Computational Intelligence 792, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99283-9_5
87
88
M. D. Gibbons et al.
of noise, trust, spatial mechanisms and other extensions. One interesting extension that has been explored in the literature is that of N-player social dilemmas [3] where N agents participate simultaneously in the interaction. Each agent can cooperate or defect, and receives a reward based on the number of cooperators present. Additionally, cooperators incur a cost to interact while defectors do not. In this work, we consider populations of agents participating in both the 2-player and N-player versions of the prisoner’s dilemma, and the clusters of cooperators formed therein. We adopt a spatial model where agents’ interactions are defined by some topological constraints. Much recent work has focused on the effect of such constraints [4–6]. We use a toroidal lattice where agents may interact with their immediate eight neighbours, if any. We further imbue the agents with the ability to move based on environmental stimuli. The role of mobility in the evolution of cooperati
Data Loading...
