Measuring presidentialism and parliamentarism: An Application to Central and East European Countries
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Measuring presidentialism and parliamentarism: An Application to Central and East European Countries Andre´ Krouwel Department of Political Science, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected]
In the political science literature, the simple dichotomy of parliamentarism and presidentialism is dominant, although more extensive classifications of executive– legislative relations have been suggested. This article seeks to move away from mere categorization of political regimes by developing a continuous and relative measure of ‘presidentialism’ and ‘parliamentarism’. It thus becomes possible to make more meaningful and precise cross-national comparisons as well as to analyse the systemic transformation of countries over time. This sharper analytic differentiation of regimes is particularly important when one studies political regimes in transition. This article will show that relative measures of presidentialism and parliamentarism are useful in analysing the executive–legislative relations of political systems and that this continuous measure can be used to examine more closely the assumed relationship between different regime types and democratic consolidation and stability. This is substantively important as it can affect the contradictory findings of empirical research into institutional formats and regime stability and performance. Acta Politica (2003) 38, 333–364. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500041 Keywords: presidentialism; parliamentarism; political system classification; Central and Eastern Europe; political stability
Introduction In the political science literature, often a close link is assumed between institutional arrangements and democratic consolidation or political stability (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring, 1993; Weaver and Rockman, 1993; Sartori, 1994a; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997a; Przeworski et al., 2000; Haggard and McCubbins, 2001). Linz (1990a; b) was one of the first scholars to argue that presidentialism leads to political instability because of its dual popular mandate and dual democratic legitimacy. Both the president and the parliament derive their authority from a popular election, which may lead to deadlock in terms of policy-making (Linz, 1994, 7). Linz also argued that presidential systems are inherently inflexible and rigid as a result of fixed terms
Andre´ Krouwel Measuring presidentialism and parliamentarism
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in office and strict constitutional arrangements. This could not only lead to inertia, but also to instability since a president cannot be removed for mere political reasons and his or her political foes may thus attempt removal by legal means, such as impeachment, or worse. The single-person executive is also prone to instability as, besides the risk of insanity, alcoholism and other physical and psychological flaws, it entails a substantial accumulation of power within one individual risking the dangers of abuse of power and authoritarianism. In fact, Shugart and Carey (1992) have argued that it is the concentration of legislative power
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