Metaphysical explanations and the counterfactual theory of explanation
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Metaphysical explanations and the counterfactual theory of explanation Stefan Roski1
Ó The Author(s) 2020
Abstract According to an increasingly popular view among philosophers of science, both causal and non-causal explanations can be accounted for by a single theory: the counterfactual theory of explanation. A kind of non-causal explanation that has gained much attention recently but that this theory seems unable to account for are grounding explanations. Reutlinger (Eur J Philos Sci 7(2):239-256, 2017) has argued that, despite these appearances to the contrary, such explanations are covered by his version of the counterfactual theory. His idea is supported by recent work on grounding by Schaffer and Wilson who claim there to be a tight connection between grounding and counterfactual dependence. The present paper evaluates the prospects of the idea. We show that there is only a weak sense in which grounding explanations convey information about counterfactual dependencies, and that this fact cannot plausibly be taken to reveal a distinctive feature that grounding explanations share with other kinds of explanations. Keywords Grounding Metaphysical explanation Counterfactuals
1 Introduction For a long while, the notion of explanation figured in metaphysical debates mainly in connection with questions of theory choice, explanatory power being one dimension along which competing metaphysical theories can be compared. Since a couple of years, however, metaphysicians have become interested in explanation from a different, more direct perspective. In particular, the view that there are & Stefan Roski [email protected] 1
¨ berseering 35, Postfach #4, 22297 Hamburg, Philosophisches Seminar, Universita¨t Hamburg, U Germany
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certain distinctively metaphysical explanations has become increasingly popular. Arguably the most prominent cases in point (though not the only ones) are explanations based on grounding.1 Pertinent examples include explanations of logically complex truths in terms of their simpler constituents (e.g.: Socrates is Greek and wise partially because he is wise), explanations of truths about determinables in terms of truths about corresponding determinates (e.g.: The taxi is colored because it is yellow), and explanations of truths about mental properties in terms of truths about neurological properties (e.g.: Kim is in pain because Kim’s c-fibres are firing). While it is widely acknowledged that there are such explanations, there is no consensus on how they relate to explanations that have mostly been at issue in the pertinent debates in the philosophy of science, i.e. explanations based on causal relations (e.g.: The species became extinct due to the prevalence of predators). In a recent paper, Reutlinger (2017) has argued that both types of explanations can be accounted for by the same theory of explanation— indeed, by a theory that follows the highly popular counterfactual approach to explanation. Reutlinger’s proposal is part of a growing trend in the philosophy of science, w
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