Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Jane Austin: Game theorist
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Michael Suk‑Young Chwe, Jane Austin: Game theorist Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2013, xiii + 274 pages, USD 49.95 (hardback) Marek M. Kaminski1
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2020
Jane Austen (1775–1817) lived her short life during the prosperous imperial Georgian era in a family of noble roots but modest income. British life was stable, and income was predictable. With few professional opportunities for women, the only realistic career path was to marry well. Looking for husbands mostly engaged young women’s imagination. Unsurprisingly, then, all of Austen’s novels revolve around romance and marriage. The title of Michael Chwe’s book could suggest a lack of serious game-theoretic content. This is not true. The table of contents reveals why, as does a quick glimpse at the back-cover’s endorsements from game theorists like Thomas Schelling. The book includes a thorough reconstruction of Austen’s views on strategic thinking, as well as her innovations, including the concept of “cluelessness.” Austen raises serious and interesting issues. Austen’s recurring theme in her novels is the matching process within the British gentry. Matching involves someone expressing interest in another under incomplete information about the other’s reciprocal interest. The reward for success is obvious, but failure to obtain reciprocity is punished by embarrassment and other consequences. Modern matchmakers ingeniously lower the embarrassment-related transaction costs of matching. On Match.com, anybody who likes X can signal their interest with an explicit “wink.” One can also “like” X secretly. In the latter case, your profile is “randomly” suggested to X among others, so that X can assess it and possibly “like” you back. If reciprocated, your “like” is revealed, and a “match” occurs. Social constraints made matching within Austen’s world a much tougher game, with limited options for signaling interest and harsher embarrassment consequences. Moreover, local matching markets were small, and opportunity windows for women closed fast; if they had not married by 30, they were considered “old maids.” Similar social habitats could handsomely reward strategic sophistication. In such an environment, one would expect to see stories with strategic content. Chwe estimates that in Austen’s six major novels, there are over 50 strategic “schemes” (p. 5). We can acquaint ourselves with Austen’s world by analyzing one particularly clever “scheme” from Pride and Prejudice.
* Marek M. Kaminski [email protected] 1
Department of Political Science, University of California, 3151 University Plaza, Irvine, CA 92617, USA
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Public Choice
New local neighbors inspire Mrs. Bennet to advertise her five unmarried daughters. After young, rich, and unmarried Mr. Bingley acquires nearby Netherfield Park, Jane receives a dinner invitation from his sister. Mrs. Bennet insists that she ride on horseback. When Jane protests, “I had much rather go in the coach,” Mrs. Bennet reveals her scheme: “
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