Modality and constitution in distinctively mathematical explanations
- PDF / 299,114 Bytes
- 10 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 94 Downloads / 197 Views
(2020) 10:28
PAPER IN GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Modality and constitution in distinctively mathematical explanations Mark Povich 1 Received: 30 October 2019 / Accepted: 1 May 2020/ # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Lange (2013, 2016) argues that some natural phenomena can be explained by appeal to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In these “distinctively mathematical” explanations (DMEs), the core explanatory facts are either modally stronger than facts about ordinary causal law or understood to be constitutive of the physical task or arrangement at issue. Craver and Povich (2017) argue that Lange’s account of DME fails to exclude certain “reversals”. Lange (2018) has replied that his account can avoid these directionality charges. Specifically, Lange argues that in legitimate DMEs, but not in their “reversals,” the empirical fact appealed to in the explanation is “understood to be constitutive of the physical task or arrangement at issue” in the explanandum. I argue that Lange’s reply is unsatisfactory because it leaves the crucial notion of being “understood to be constitutive of the physical task or arrangement” obscure in ways that fail to block “reversals” except by an apparent ad hoc stipulation or by abandoning the reliance on understanding and instead accepting a strong realism about essence. Keywords Scientific explanation . Distinctively mathematical explanation
Directionality . Explanatory asymmetry . Ontic conception . Modal conception
1 Introduction Lange (2013, 2016) argues that some natural phenomena can be explained by appeal to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In these “distinctively mathematical” explanations (DMEs), the core explanatory facts are either modally stronger than facts about
* Mark Povich [email protected]
1
Philosophy Department, Tulane University, 6823 St Charles Ave, New Orleans, LA 70118, USA
28
Page 2 of 10
European Journal for Philosophy of Science
(2020) 10:28
ordinary causal law or understood to be constitutive of the physical task or arrangement at issue.1 Craver and Povich (2017) argue that Lange’s account of DME fails to exclude certain “reversals”. Lange (2018) has replied that his account can avoid these directionality charges. Specifically, Lange argues that in legitimate DMEs, but not in their “reversals,” the empirical fact appealed to in the explanation is “understood to be constitutive of the physical task or arrangement at issue” in the explanandum. I argue that Lange’s reply is unsatisfactory because it leaves the crucial notion of being “understood to be constitutive of the physical task or arrangement” obscure in ways that fail to block “reversals” except by an apparent ad hoc stipulation or by abandoning the reliance on understanding and instead accepting a strong realism about essence. In Section 2, I briefly review the directionality objection and Lange’s (2018) reply. In Section 3, I argue that the notion of “constitution” to which Lange appeals cannot exclude Craver and Povich’s “reversals” as DMEs, on pain of abandonin
Data Loading...
