Normative Ethics Does Not Need a Foundation: It Needs More Science
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Normative Ethics Does Not Need a Foundation: It Needs More Science Katinka Quintelier • Linda Van Speybroeck Johan Braeckman
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Received: 15 June 2009 / Accepted: 8 April 2010 / Published online: 21 April 2010 The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract The impact of science on ethics forms since long the subject of intense debate. Although there is a growing consensus that science can describe morality and explain its evolutionary origins, there is less consensus about the ability of science to provide input to the normative domain of ethics. Whereas defenders of a scientific normative ethics appeal to naturalism, its critics either see the naturalistic fallacy committed or argue that the relevance of science to normative ethics remains undemonstrated. In this paper, we argue that current scientific normative ethicists commit no fallacy, that criticisms of scientific ethics contradict each other, and that scientific insights are relevant to normative inquiries by informing ethics about the options open to the ethical debate. Moreover, when conceiving normative ethics as being a nonfoundational ethics, science can be used to evaluate every possible norm. This stands in contrast to foundational ethics in which some norms remain beyond scientific inquiry. Finally, we state that a difference in conception of normative ethics underlies the disagreement between proponents and opponents of a scientific ethics. Our argument is based on and preceded by a reconsideration of the notions naturalistic fallacy and foundational ethics. This argument differs from previous work in scientific ethics: whereas before the philosophical project of naturalizing the normative has been stressed, here we focus on concrete consequences of biological findings for normative decisions or on the day-to-day normative relevance of these scientific insights. Keywords Science and ethics Naturalistic ethics Normative ethics Naturalistic fallacy K. Quintelier (&) L. Van Speybroeck J. Braeckman Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Research Unit ‘The Moral Brain’, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] K. Quintelier Center for Behavior, Evolution & Culture, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles, 341 Haines Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1553, USA
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1 Introduction How do we know right from wrong? Do we dig deep into our intuitions? Should science offer a full picture of human virtue? These questions remain as yet unresolved, and continue to offer ample room for academic debate. Especially the importance of science for ethics proves to be substantially discussed (e.g., Kurtz 2007; Pigliucci 2003). Many authors agree that science can describe morality and that science can go a long way in explaining morality’s origins (e.g., Joyce 2006). But there is much disagreement about the relevance of science for the normative domain of ethics. Normative ethics concerns questions about right an
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