Phenomenology of imagining and the pragmatics of fictional language
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Phenomenology of imagining and the pragmatics of fictional language Michela Summa1
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract This paper focuses on the performative character of fictional language. While assuming that all speaking is a form of acting, it aims to shed light on the nature of fictional, and particularly literary, speech acts. To this aim, relevant input can be found in (a) the discussion of the ontological status of fictional entities and of their constitution and in (b) the inquiry into the interaction between author and receiver of a fictional work. Based on the critical assessment of different approaches in the debate on speech-act theory and literary fiction, the article first clarifies why the study of the performative character of fictional language cannot be reduced to either the discussion of the status of singular speech acts in the fiction or the inquiry into the pretend or unserious nature of fictional speech acts formulated by an author. While referring to Roman Ingarden’s, Jean-Paul Sartre’s, and Wolfgang Iser’s work, it subsequently argues that such a performative character should be understood as a specific serious affordance—or appeal—to imagine and thus to participate in the constitution of the fictional world. Keywords Fiction · Imagination · Speech-act theory · Phenomenology · Roman Ingarden · Wolfgang Iser · Jean-Paul Sartre The current debate in the philosophy of fiction is largely devoted to questions concerning the ontological status of fictional entities and the epistemic status of fictional truths. While the former questions concern the kind of beings fictional entities are (e.g., if they are part of the ontology of the real world or of possible worlds, if they can be considered to be existent at all, etc.), the latter concern the epistemic status of fictional statement (e.g., whether these statements can be said to be true or false, whether we should qualify and restrict the context in which they can be said to be true or false, etc.). These areas of research are strictly connected: Answers to the question of whether and how fictional statements can be said to be true or false * Michela Summa michela.summa@uni‑wuerzburg.de 1
Institut für Philosophie, Universität Würzburg, Josef‑Stangl‑Platz 2, 97070 Würzburg, Germany
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largely depend on assumptions concerning the ontological status of fictional entities.1 Thereby, the ontology of fictional entities has been connected to the semantics of fictional language. Clearly, the analysis of fictional language is not limited to semantics and openly touches upon aspects of pragmatics.2 However, a closer inquiry into the connection between the ontology of fictional entities and the pragmatics of fictional language is still lacking. This article focuses on such a connection. More precisely, I first wish to discuss whether fictional language can be considered to have what J.L. Austin defines as a performative function. Secondly, having provided reasons for answering the previous question in the affirmative
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