Scientific perspectivism in the phenomenological tradition
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(2020) 10:30
PAPER IN GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Open Access
Scientific perspectivism in the phenomenological tradition Philipp Berghofer 1 Received: 18 October 2019 / Accepted: 13 May 2020/ # The Author(s) 2020
Abstract In current debates, many philosophers of science have sympathies for the project of introducing a new approach to the scientific realism debate that forges a middle way between traditional forms of scientific realism and anti-realism. One promising approach is perspectivism. Although different proponents of perspectivism differ in their respective characterizations of perspectivism, the common idea is that scientific knowledge is necessarily partial and incomplete. Perspectivism is a new position in current debates but it does have its forerunners. Figures that are typically mentioned in this context include Dewey, Feyerabend, Leibniz, Kant, Kuhn, and Putnam. Interestingly, to my knowledge, there exists no work that discusses similarities to the phenomenological tradition. This is surprising because here one can find systematically similar ideas and even a very similar terminology. It is startling because early modern physics was noticeably influenced by phenomenological ideas. And it is unfortunate because the analysis of perspectival approaches in the phenomenological tradition can help us to achieve a more nuanced understanding of different forms of perspectivism. The main objective of this paper is to show that in the phenomenological tradition one finds a wellelaborated philosophy of science that shares important similarities with current versions of perspectivism. Engaging with the phenomenological tradition is also of systematic value since it helps us to gain a better understanding of the distinctive claims of perspectivism and to distinguish various grades of perspectivism. Keywords Scientific realism . Perspectivism . Phenomenology . Husserl . Merleau-Ponty .
QBism This article belongs to the Topical Collection: Perspectivism in science: metaphysical and epistemological reflections Guest Editor: Michela Massimi
* Philipp Berghofer philipp.berghofer@uni–graz.at
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Department for Philosophy, University of Graz, Heinrichstraße 26/5, 8010, Graz, Austria
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European Journal for Philosophy of Science
(2020) 10:30
1 Perspectivism in current debates Advocating scientific realism, broadly speaking, means adopting “a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences” (Chakravartty 2017). It is safe to say that scientific realism is the dominant view among the public. This is particularly due to the undeniable success of the sciences in making predictions and in contributing to the technological advancements we witness on a daily basis. Also among philosophers of science, the main motivation for adopting a realist position is the notorious miracle argument which quotes scientific realism as the best explanation for the obvious success of ou
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