Self-control and the self

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Self-control and the self Hannah Altehenger1 Received: 2 June 2020 / Accepted: 14 September 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020

Abstract Prima facie, it seems highly plausible to suppose that there is some kind of constitutive relationship between self-control and the self, i.e., that self-control is “control at the service of the self” or even “control by the self.” This belief is not only attractive from a pre-theoretical standpoint, but it also seems to be supported by theoretical reasons. In particular, there is a natural fit between a certain attractive approach to self-control—the so-called “divided mind approach”—and a certain well-established approach to the self—the so-called “deep self” approach. I argue, however, that this initial impression is misleading: on closer inspection, the combination of the divided mind approach to self-control with the deep self approach fails to provide us with a theoretical foundation for the claim that self-control is constitutively linked to the self. I show that, in an interesting twist, combining these two approaches actually supports the opposite claim, leading us to the view that self-control and the self can come apart, and, more specifically, that we sometimes exercise self-control without our self or even against our self. Keywords Self-control · Self · Divided mind approach to self-control · Two motivational systems views of self-control · Deep self views

1 Introduction It is natural to think that self-control is “control at the service of the self” or even “control by the self.” Not only is this view suggested by the simple etymological fact that “self-control” contains the word “self”; it is also the belief we spontaneously arrive at when we think about paradigmatic cases of self-control. Take, for example, the case in which you exercise self-control to resist a craving for yet another salty snack. In this case, you will (likely) identify with the behavior you try to bring about by exercising self-control (maintaining a healthy diet) rather than with the behavior

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Hannah Altehenger [email protected] Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich, Zürichbergstrasse 43, 8044 Zurich, Switzerland

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you try to suppress by exercising self-control (having another salty snack). Or take the case in which I exercise self-control in order to suppress the impulse to yell at my kids. Again, I will (likely) identify with the behavior I try to bring about by exercising self-control (keeping my temper in front of my kids) rather than with the behavior I try to suppress by exercising self-control (yelling at my kids). This, in turn, may easily lead us to the adoption of the belief that self-control always “sides with the self.” Moreover, the belief that there is some kind of constitutive relationship between selfcontrol and the self may not only appear attractive from a pre-theoretical standpoint. Prima facie, there also seem to be theoretical reasons which favor this view. In particular, there is a natural fit between a certain attractive approach to se