The Case for a Carbon Tax Getting Past Our Hang-Ups to Effective Cli
There's a simple, straightforward way to cut carbon emissions and prevent the most disastrous effects of climate change-and we're rejecting it because of irrational political fears. That's the central argument of The Case for a Carbon Tax, a clear-eyed, s
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The Case for a Carbon Tax getting past our hang-ups to effective climate policy
Shi-Ling Hsu
Washington | Covelo | London
Copyright © 2011 Shi-Ling Hsu All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the publisher: Island Press, 1718 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 300 Washington, DC 20009. ISLAND PRESS is a trademark of the Center for Resource Economics.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hsu, Shi-Ling. The case for a carbon tax : getting past our hang-ups to effective climate policy / Shi-Ling Hsu. — 1st ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-59726-531-7 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 1-59726-531-4 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-1-59726-533-1 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 1-59726-533-0 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Carbon taxes. 2. Climatic changes— Government policy. I. Title. HJ5316.H78 2011 363.738′746—dc23 2011014901 Printed on recycled, acid-free paper
Manufactured in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Keywords: climate change, environmental policy, cap-and-trade, energy subsidies, renewable energy, Kyoto Protocol, greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, environmental economics, Stern Report
For my children, Katharine and Allen
contents
Acknowledgments
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
1
Chapter 2
Climate Change Policy Alternatives
13
Carbon Taxes Command-and-Control Regulation Cap-and-Trade Government Subsidies
15 17 20 23
Chapter 3
Ten Arguments for a Carbon Tax One: Economic Efficiency Two: Excessive Formation of Capital Three: Non-Interference with Other Regulatory Instruments or Jurisdictions Four: Government Is Better at Reducing “Bads” Than Increasing “Goods” Five: Incentives for Innovation—Price Effects Six: Incentives for Innovation—Price Breadth Seven: Administrability Eight: International Coordination Nine: Revenue Raising Ten: Economic Efficiency Revisited: Prices versus Quantities under Uncertainty Conclusion
Chapter 4
Arguments against a Carbon Tax Political Economy Considerations Regressiveness Ineffectiveness Crowding Out Conclusion
Chapter 5
Carbon Tax Psychology The “Do No Harm” Effect The Identifiability Effect
25 27 41 46 53 65 77 84 90 101 104 115
117 118 124 138 143 145
147 152 163
The Endowment Effect Conclusion
170 179
Chapter 6
Changing Political Fortunes?
181
Chapter 7
Conclusion
191
Endnotes
195
Index
223
acknowledgments
I tease my wife about things that take longer than she initially thinks they would, but to put up a mirror and consider my own projects, this book is really very typical of the things that I have done with some care: it took much longer than I thought it would. Along the way, I benefited from the comments, advice, support, and input of many people, including Michael Waggoner, Michael Meurer, David Weisbach, Dan Cole, Scott Schang; and from the many fine faculty and students that have attended workshops at Pace Law School, the James E. Roge
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