The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection
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The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection Andreas Stephens1 · Trond A. Tjøstheim1 Received: 31 January 2020 / Accepted: 21 July 2020 © The Author(s) 2020
Abstract Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection (understood as second-order mental states). According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to underlie a separate form of knowledge. We show that a broader understanding of reflection, encompassing Type 2 processes, working memory, and episodic long-term memory, can provide philosophy with elucidating input that a restricted view misses. We further argue that reflection in fact often does add reliability, through generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations, even if the restricted sense of both reflection and knowledge is accepted. And so, a division of knowledge into one reflexive (animal) form and one reflective form remains a plausible, and possibly fruitful, option.
1 Introduction Throughout the history of Western philosophy, reflection has been considered an especially important human ability. Its role has long been prominent and can still be found at the center of theories by contemporary scholars such as, for example, BonJour (1985, 1998), Chisholm (1989), and Sosa (2007, 2009). Accordingly, a lot of effort has been invested in the inquiry of its role for thinking, knowledge, and justification. Common traditional positions have included that reflection is necessary in order to guarantee that an agent’s knowledge is acceptable and certain, that her epistemic duty is fulfilled, that her knowledge is accessible, and that faulty beliefs due to inferential errors are avoided (see, e.g., Pappas 2017; see also Bortolotti 2011). But in contrast to the above-described positions, Hilary Kornblith in his book On reflection (2012) points out that the common interpretation of reflection is problematic since reflection actually cannot provide that which many believe it can. Indeed much relevant research seems to indicate that rather than providing trustworthy * Andreas Stephens [email protected] 1
Lund University, Box 192, 221 00 Lund, Sweden
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knowledge, reflection can be quite unreliable. Numerous psychological studies, seemingly, show how human reflection often fails due to, for example, various biases (see, e.g., Stanovich and West 2000; Kahneman 2011). With this in mind, the importance of reflection, and its role for human thinking, knowledge, and justification, should arguably be deemphasized. This leaves us at an interesting junction. On the one hand, reflection seems to underlie the very essence of human greatness and is commonly seen as a particularly important phenomenon. On the other hand, empirical evidence seems to support Kornblith’s view and suggest that reflection only brings a false sense of certainty. We recognize that inquiries are affected by the inquirer’s stance (approach, commitment
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