The Single-Neuron Theory Closing in on the Neural Correlate of Consc

This book presents an engaging account of a provocative new theory which explores how our brain generates conscious experience and where this occurs. It suggests that conscious experience happens not at the whole brain level but at the level of individual

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the single-neuron theory closing in on the neural correlate of consciousness

The Single-Neuron Theory

Steven Sevush

The Single-Neuron Theory Closing in on the Neural Correlate of Consciousness

Steven Sevush School of Medicine University of Miami Miami, Florida, USA

ISBN 978-3-319-33707-4 ISBN 978-3-319-33708-1 DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-33708-1

(eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016947045 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Cover illustration: © The Science Picture Company / Alamy Stock Photo Printed on acid-free paper This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland

Foreword

The question posed by this book is very simple yet very perplexing. When we look at a red rose, where exactly in our head are the mental events that give rise to that sense of redness? And if there were any doubt that this sensed redness is concocted inside the head, rather than outside, think of that viral smartphone snap of the blue and black—or was it white and gold?—dress. The colours we sense may track reflectance or transmission properties of patches of the outside world quite well, most of the time. But if the tracking can fail we know we must be getting an internal mockup, not ‘the outside world itself ’. As Newton understood well, colours are ‘phantasms’ manufactured inside by brains and we want to know where. We want to know the neural correlates of consciousness. It is sometimes suggested that thoughts and sensations have no particular position in space. What seems more likely, however, is that this is just a false inference based on the fact that we have no machinery for tracking where ideas are inside us in the way we do have for things we can see or pick up, like red roses. (We do seem to have internal time tracking.) In the same way, a police speed-trap camera can happily report to us the plate num