Reasoning strategies predict use of very fast logical reasoning
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Reasoning strategies predict use of very fast logical reasoning Henry Markovits 1 & Pier-Luc de Chantal 1 & Janie Brisson 1 & Éloise Dubé 1 & Valerie Thompson 2 & Ian Newman 2 Accepted: 2 October 2020 # The Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2020
Abstract The dual strategy model proposes that people use one of two potential ways of processing information when making inferences. The statistical strategy generates a rapid probabilistic estimate based on associative access to a wide array of information, while the counterexample strategy uses a more focused representation, allowing for a search for potential counterexamples. In the following studies, we explore the hypothesis that individual differences in strategy use are related to the ability to make rapid intuitive logical judgments. In Study 1, we show that this is the case for rapid judgments requiring a distinction between simple logical form and for a novel form of judgment, the ability to identify inferences that are not linked to their premises (non sequiturs). In Study 2, we show that strategy use is related to the ability to make the kinds of rapid logical judgments previously examined over and above contributions of working memory capacity. Study 3 shows that strategy use explains individual variability in rapid logical responding with belief-biased inferences over and above the contribution of IQ. The results of Studies 2 and 3 indicate that under severe time constraint cognitive capacity is a very poor predictor of reasoning, while strategy use becomes a stronger predictor. These results extend the notion that people can make rapid intuitive “logical” judgments while highlighting the importance of strategy use as a key individual difference variable. Keywords Reasoning . Reasoning strategy . Logical intuition
Humans are notoriously inconsistent reasoners. When making inferences and judgments they show both an ability to produce “logical” answers along with a well-documented tendency to use heuristic shortcuts, such as the belief bias effect (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Markovits & Nantel, 1989). The prevailing explanation for such inconsistency postulates that people have access to two competing inferential systems. These models are known as dual process models (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Epstein, 1994; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, West, Ackerman, Kyllonen, & Roberts, 1999). Although there are many different instantiations of this model, most suppose a distinction between processing systems that give rise to relatively automatic responses (Type 1) and those that are more effortful (Type 2; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Type 1 responses tend to be fast, and thus form an early, default response, whereas answers requiring more cognitive capacity
* Henry Markovits [email protected] 1
Département de psychologie, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, Québec, Canada
2
University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada
tend to be slower. This asymmetry in speed underlies the dual-process theory explanation for many
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