Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes A Defense of Internal Realis

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The purpose of the book is to develop internal realism, the metaphysical-episte­ mological doctrine initiated by Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History, "Introduction", Many Faces). In doing so I shall rely - sometimes quite hea

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SYNTHESE LIBRARY STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY, LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Managing Editor:

JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Boston University

Editors: DIRK VAN DALEN, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands DONALD DAVIDSON, University of California, Berkeley THEO A.F. KUIPERS, University of Groningen, The Netherlands PATRICK SUPPES, Stanford University, California JAN WOLEN-SKI, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland

VOLUME 296

GABOR FORRA! University of Miskolc, Hungary

REFERENCE, TRUTH AND

CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES A Defense of Internal Realism

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

A c.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 978-90-481-5677-1 DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-2868-3

ISBN 978-94-017-2868-3 (eBook)

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved © 200 I Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2001 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book has grown out of my PhD dissertation written at the University of Notre Dame under Gary Gutting's supervision. I am very grateful to him for his advice and encouragement. I have also benefitted from the conversations with Marian David and Michael Kremer. In the following years I also had a chance to discuss the issues treated here with Ferenc Altrichter, Marta Feher, Ferenc Huoranszki, Tihamer Margitay, Howard Robinson and Marta Ujvari. Katalin Bimbo, Katalin Farkas and Zoltan Szabo have read parts of the original manuscript, and their comments were extremely valuable. Peter Sullivan and Jose Luis Bermudez have read the complete manuscript and have given me excellent advice about how to restructure the material to make it more like a book rather than a PhD dissertation. Much of section 4.3 was published in Dialectica Vol. 50, Fasc. 4 (1996), pp. 259-74 under the title "Internal Realism, Metaphyiscal Realism, and Brains in a Vat". It is reproduced here with the permission of the publisher. A different form of thanks is due to my wife and daughter who accepted without complaints that I often devoted more time to the book than to them. Gabor Forrai

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. 1.2.

Historical Background The Plan of the Book

CHAPTER 2

METAPHYSICAL REALISM AND INTERNAL REALISM

10

2.1. 2.2.

Metaphysical Realism Internal Realism

10 23

CHAPTER 3

REFERENCE

40

3.1. 3.2. 3.3.

An Internal Realist Account of Reference Quinean Indeterminacy and MiscIassification Twin Earth and Mental Content

41 51 62

CHAPTER 4

TRUTH

73

4.1. 4.2. 4.3.

Truth Within a Conceptual Scheme The Adequacy of Conceptual Schemes Global Skepticism and Brains in a Vat

74 83 96

CHAPTERS

CONCEPTUAL PLURALISM

110

5.1. 5.2. 5.3.

On Sharing a Domain Davidson's Challenge Physicalism, Naturalism, and Relativism

110 117