Risk and Resilience Analysis of Public Civil Buildings Against Shelling with Explosive Sources in Urban Contexts

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Risk and Resilience Analysis of Public Civil Buildings Against Shelling with Explosive Sources in Urban Contexts I. Häring1 · M. Pfeiffer1 · G. Vogelbacher1 · A. Stottmeister1 · E.‑M. Restayn1 · K. Ross1 · M. V. Ramin1 Received: 3 July 2019 / Accepted: 2 August 2019 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Abstract Due to their high availability and low cost level, passive protection measures are a key factor for reducing the vulnerability of persons within and close to assets against potentially impacting mortar, rocket and artillery threats. Particularly, mortar shelling has even most recently been reported. At risk are permanent and nonpermanent assets of civil, (non)governmental or peacekeeping organizations with corresponding effects, e.g., on civil society, civil services or successful nation building, respectively. Of interest are the identification of vulnerable areas and the assessment of the effectiveness of protective structures while taking also other counter measures into account. To this end, a seven-step quantitative risk and resilience analysis and management methodology is described and applied. It consists of the analysis of scenarios, frequencies, hazards, damage effects and risks and yields individual and collective risks for multi-threat scenarios. Local individual or collective risks can be minimized below criteria, thus reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience in an efficient way, e.g., by using geometrical changes, by structural roof, wall and window retrofits, by mitigating barriers and/or organizational measures. The approach is demonstrated along with three detailed example cases. Keywords  Quantitative and probabilistic risk and resilience analysis · Terroristic shelling · Impact · Mortar · Rocket · Artillery · Passive protection · Retrofit · Asset protection · Physical security · Resilience management

* I. Häring [email protected] 1



Fraunhofer Institute for High-Speed Dynamics, Ernst-Mach-Institut, Am Klingelberg 1, 79588 Efringen‑Kirchen, Germany

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1 Introduction In the past, there have been repeated incidents of terrorist organizations firing explosive shells at targets from a distance. Known cases in Europe include the IRA’s mortar attacks against British or pro-British facilities, for example the 1985 Newry mortar attack (NYT 1985), the 1991 Downing Street mortar attack (Whitney 1991) or the 1996 Osnabrück mortar attack (McDonald 2017). Mortar attacks were dominating in the past, whereas rocket attacks are believed to be feasible as well today, when considering the rather small dimensions of both means of attack. Artillery events, on the other hand, are considered very unlikely due to the heavy launching equipment. Since the turn of the millennium, modern terrorism in the West has focused more on apparently random attacks on civilian and public “soft” targets rather than on selected representative buildings of politics or diplomacy of high symbolic value. Also, new attack strategies such as vehicle ramming (Miller and