the transatlantic crisis: the wolf is at the door
- PDF / 90,994 Bytes
- 7 Pages / 536 x 697 pts Page_size
- 111 Downloads / 177 Views
Abstract Since the re-election of George W. Bush in November 2004, there has been a renewal of optimism about the state of the transatlantic relationship. This meshes easily with those in the academic community who believe that the relationship has always been – and remains – far stronger than some argued before and after the Iraq War. This comfortable view is challenged here and, based upon an analysis of both domestic and international factors, the article insists that even though the relationship will persist, difficult times lie ahead in the European–US relationship. The future is likely to see more strains across the Atlantic not less.
Keywords
transatlantic relations; NATO; George W. Bush; Robert Kagan;
Iraq war
A
ll great crises bring cherished truths into question, and there was no truth more cherished during that long moment known as the post-war period (and that shorter one referred to now as the post-Cold War era) that while empires might fall and new nations might rise, the transatlantic relationship would survive come what may. Even in the absence of a serious threat to its integrity after 1991, the deal struck after WWII seemed to hold. Tied together by economics, united through values, and intimately associated through a complex web of institutions, the community created between the United States and Europe in the second half of the twentieth century looked set to become an equally impor-
34
tant part of the international scene at the start of the twenty-first century (Peterson and Pollack, 2003). Engaging in prediction is a risky and dangerous business. Nonetheless, if there was one prediction that most scholars would have been prepared to make on the eve of the new millennium, it was that the transatlantic family would remain united. Spats might occur; harsh words might be uttered. But at the end of the day, ideology, interests, and institutions meant that nothing was likely to disturb the peace across the Atlantic. If events since 2001 have proved anything, it is that we should all beware the hydra-headed danger called intellectual complacency. Indeed, not only did the overwhelming majority of experts fail to
european political science: 5 2006 (34 – 40) & 2006 European Consortium for Political Research. 1680-4333/06 $30 www.palgrave-journals.com/eps
see the storm coming – in much the same way as they failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War – but were intellectually illequipped to do so for one very simple reason: they had already determined that Europe and the United States were more likely to bind than clash. How wrong this particular assumption turned out to be. The story is by now well known. Things began to go badly wrong very soon after Bush took office in early 2001 (Daalder, 2001). By the end of the year (in spite of the momentary solidarity caused by 9/11), the relationship was in serious trouble. A year on as the US prepared for war with Iraq it looked to be in free fall. And by the beginning of 2003, many were beginning to ask whether it could even survive at all. Somethin
Data Loading...
