There is no dilemma for conceptual engineering. Reply to Max Deutsch
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There is no dilemma for conceptual engineering. Reply to Max Deutsch Steffen Koch1
Accepted: 13 September 2020 The Author(s) 2020
Abstract Max Deutsch (in: Philosophical studies, online-first. https://doi.org/ 10.1007/s11098-020-01416-z, 2020) has recently argued that conceptual engineering is stuck in a dilemma. If it is construed as the activity of revising the semantic meanings of existing terms, then it faces an unsurmountable implementation problem. If, on the other hand, it is construed as the activity of introducing new technical terms, then it becomes trivial. According to Deutsch, this conclusion need not worry us, however, for conceptual engineering is ill-motivated to begin with. This paper responds to Deutsch by arguing, first, that there is a third construal of conceptual engineering, neglected by him, which renders it both implementable and non-trivial, and second, that even the more ambitious project of changing semantic meanings is no less feasible than other normative projects we currently pursue. Lastly, the value of conceptual engineering is defended against Deutsch’s objections. Keywords Conceptual engineering Implementation challenge Semantic meaning Speaker-meaning Max Deutsch
1 Deutsch’s dilemma Conceptual engineering is on the rise. Almost every month, new papers are published, proposing to engineer this or that concept; and theorizing about conceptual engineering is now an established and growing area of metaphilosophy. While the reception of conceptual engineering has mostly been friendly, even enthusiastic, there are also a few critical voices. One of them is Max Deutsch, who & Steffen Koch [email protected] 1
Ruhr-Universita¨t Bochum, Institut fu¨r Philosophie II, Universita¨tsstraße 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany
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S. Koch
has recently argued that conceptual engineering does not deserve the attention it currently receives; for upon scrutiny, it does not provide philosophers with the implementable and underappreciated methodological tool that its advocates claim it does (Deutsch 2020). This paper responds to Deutsch’s critical take on conceptual engineering. According to Deutsch, advocates of conceptual engineering are stuck in a dilemma. The two horns of this dilemma stem from two different ways of engaging in conceptual engineering. The first is to introduce new concepts; the second is to revise concepts that are already being used. Let us call these activities ‘conceptual construction’ and ‘conceptual re-engineering’ respectively. Deutsch argues that neither conceptual construction nor conceptual re-engineering are feasible and underexplored philosophical methods. But, according to Deutsch, this conclusion is less worrisome than it may first seem, because the typical rationale for the value of conceptual engineering is mistaken anyway. Let me begin with a caveat. As of yet, there is no agreement about what the objects of conceptual engineering are, and various options are on the table. I develop and defend one of these options elsewhere (Koch 2020). For present purpo
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