Preemption and a counterfactual analysis of divine causation
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Preemption and a counterfactual analysis of divine causation Ryan Kulesa1 Received: 13 June 2020 / Accepted: 26 August 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract This paper aims to outline a counterfactual theory of divine atemporal causation that avoids problems of preemption. As a result, the presentation of the analysis is structured such that my counterfactual analysis directly addresses preemption issues. If these problems can be avoided, the theist is well on her way to proposing a usable metaphysical concept of atemporal divine causation. In the first section, I outline Lewis’ original counterfactual analysis as well as how these cases of preemption cause problems for his analysis. In particular, two cases of preemption have proven problematic for counterfactual analyses: late preemption and trumping preemption. In the second section, I propose a counterfactual analysis of divine causation that is not subject to these problems of preemption. I present a counterfactual analysis of timeless divine causation, supplemented by a definition of what it means for God to allow an event to happen. In the third section, I argue this analysis is not prey to problems of preemption. Keywords Counterfactuals · Causation · God · Time · Preemption · Atemporal causation
Introduction Some concepts of divine atemporal causation have been proposed, but not thoroughly investigated. For instance, Brian Leftow (1991, 294) tentatively proposes a counterfactual analysis of atemporal divine sustaining. More recently, Paul Helm (2010, 241) suggested a counterfactual analysis of atemporal divine causation, albeit he does explore pitfalls of Lewis’ original counterfactual analysis of causation. Without a demonstration as to why a counterfactual analysis of divine causation does not succumb to issues surrounding Lewis’ original analysis, any such proposal would be quite difficult to defend. It is not my aim to defend these theories * Ryan Kulesa [email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Columbia, Columbia, USA
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Vol.:(0123456789)
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
or determine whether or not they can handle standard objections to Lewis’ original analysis. The main goal, instead, is to outline a counterfactual theory of divine atemporal causation that definitively avoids problems of preemption. As a result, the paper is structured such that my counterfactual analysis directly addresses preemption issues. If these problems can be avoided, the theist is well on her way to proposing a usable metaphysical concept of atemporal divine causation.1 In the first section, I outline Lewis’ original counterfactual analysis as well as how these cases of preemption cause problems for his analysis. In particular, two cases of preemption have proven problematic for counterfactual analyses: late preemption and trumping preemption. Late preemption occurs when some effect would have occurred, had the cause in the actual world not occurred, via some preempted backup cause, thereby breaking counterfactu
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