Ineffability: the Very Concept
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Ineffability: the Very Concept Sebastian Gäb 1 Received: 10 October 2019 / Revised: 21 January 2020 / Accepted: 21 February 2020 # The Author(s) 2020
Abstract In this paper, I analyze the concept of ineffability: what does it mean to say that something cannot be said? I begin by distinguishing ineffability from paradox: if something cannot be said truly or without contradiction, this is not an instance of ineffability. Next, I distinguish two different meanings of ‘saying something’ which result from a fundamental ambiguity in the term ‘language’, viz. language as a system of symbols and language as a medium of communication. Accordingly, ‘ineffability’ is ambiguous, too, and we should make a distinction between weak and strong ineffability. Weak ineffability is rooted in the deficiencies of a particular language while strong ineffability stems from the structure of a particular cognitive system and its capacities for conceptual mental representation. Mental contents are only sayable if we are able to conceptualize them and then create signs to represent them in communication. Keywords Ineffability . Language . Communication . Signs
Ineffability is a peculiar subject. It comes up occasionally in a variety of areas like philosophy of language, logic, philosophy of religion, or aesthetics, but until recently, it has rarely been itself the focus of attention.1 We stumble upon the idea in Laozi and Plotinus, Adorno and Frege, but it is hard to see the one thread which holds all these works and debates together. My intention in this paper is to find this thread by unraveling the very concept of ineffability. I take it that when we say that something is ineffable, we mean that it cannot be said – whatever this means. So, if we want to understand what it means that something cannot be said, we will have to understand what it is we are unable to do. Therefore, my starting point will be the concept of saying something. I will show that this concept is fundamentally ambiguous and that we 1
Notable exceptions are the book-length studies of Jonas (2016), Bennett-Hunter (2014), and Kukla (2005); also A.W. Moore’s work on the subject scattered over roughly a dozen or so papers and book chapters.
* Sebastian Gäb [email protected]
1
Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Studies, LMU Munich, 80539 Munich, Germany
Philosophia
should accordingly distinguish two different yet related meanings of ‘ineffable’. In what follows, I will confine myself to analyzing the concept of ineffability, i.e. I will not touch upon the question whether or not there actually are ineffable things and what evidence we might have for their existence. Any discussion on the possibility of ineffable objects requires a preliminary investigation of the concept itself – so that we understand what it is the existence of which we want to affirm or deny.
1 What Ineffability is Not If something is ineffable, it cannot be said. This much is certain. But before we start analyzing what this means, let me briefly point out what it does not mea
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