Integrated information theory of consciousness is a functionalist emergentism
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Integrated information theory of consciousness is a functionalist emergentism Ignacio Cea1 Received: 9 December 2019 / Accepted: 16 September 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract In this paper I argue that the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness has an underlying emergentist metaphysics, specifically of a kind that has received minimal attention and we may call functionalist emergentism. I will try to show that in this scientific theory conscious experience is a functional-role property possessed by the whole system, not by their parts, which is dependent on, but also (purportedly) causally powerful over and above, the properties of the parts. However, I will argue that depicting conscious experience as a functional-role emergent property threatens the whole coherence of the theory because, by definition, functional-realizers do all the causal work associated with the instantiation of any functional-role property on any occasion. Hence, to preserve the causal power of consciousness, which, as we will see, is one of the fundamental building blocks of the theory, linked to the assertion of the very existence of consciousness, phenomenal properties should be re-thought as realizers of the relevant informationally integrated causal-roles. Keywords Qualia · Phenomenal consciousness · Ontological emergence · Causal irreducibility · Functionalism · Panpsychism
1 Introduction In this paper I argue that the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (Oizumi et al. 2014; Tononi et al. 2016; Tononi 2017a, b, hereafter IIT) has an underlying emergentist metaphysics, specifically of a kind that has received minimal attention and we may call functionalist emergentism.1 On this view, phenomenal consciousness is a functional emergent property of integrated systems, in a strong ontological 1 See Bedau (1997a) for a related view that he calls emergent functionalism. A brief comparison will be done shortly.
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Ignacio Cea [email protected] Institute of Humanistic Studies “Juan Ignacio Molina”, University of Talca, Talca, Chile
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Synthese
sense. More precisely, I will try to show that within the IIT framework, conscious experience is a functional-role property possessed by the whole system, not by their parts, which is dependent on, but also (purportedly) causally powerful over and above, the properties of the parts. However, I will argue that depicting conscious experience as a functional-role emergent property threatens the whole coherence of the theory because, by definition, functional-realizers do all the causal work associated with the instantiation of any functional-role property on any occasion (Kim 1992, 1998, 2008). Hence, to preserve the causal power of consciousness, which, as we will see, is one of the very fundamental grounds of the theory, phenomenal properties should be re-thought as realizers of the relevant informationally integrated causal-roles. Importantly, in our examination of IIT’s underlying metaphysics, we are going to assume its overall plausibility as a scientific theory. If o
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