Persons, Moral Worth, and Embryos A Critical Analysis of Pro-Choice

“Bioethicists have achieved consensus on two ideas pertaining to beginning of life issues: (1) persons are those beings capable of higher-order cognition, or self-consciousness, and (2) it is impermissible to kill only persons. As a consequence, a consens

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Philosophy and Medicine VOLUME 111 Founding Co-Editor Stuart F. Spicker

Senior Editor H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Department of Philosophy, Rice University, and Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas

Associate Editor Lisa M. Rasmussen, Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, North Carolina

CATHOLIC STUDIES IN BIOETHICS Series Founding Co-Editors John Collins Harvey, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., U.S.A. Francesc Abel, Institut Borja de Bioetica, Center Borja, Barcelona, Spain Series Editor Christopher Tollefsen, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, U.S.A.

Editorial Advisory Board Joseph Boyle, St. Michael’s College, Toronto, Canada Thomas Cavanaugh, University of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, U.S.A. Mark Cherry, St. Edward’s University, Austin, TX, U.S.A. Ana Smith Iltis, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, U.S.A.

PERSONS, MORAL WORTH, AND EMBRYOS A Critical Analysis of Pro-Choice Arguments Edited by STEPHEN NAPIER National Catholic Bioethics Center, Philadelphia, PA, USA

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Editor Stephen Napier National Catholic Bioethics Center 6399 Drexel Rd 19151 Philadelphia PA, USA [email protected]

ISSN 0376-7418 ISBN 978-94-007-1601-8 e-ISBN 978-94-007-1602-5 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1602-5 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2011930731 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the following persons for helping with this project either as a reviewer or through constructive and helpful guidance: Mike Austin, Joseph Shaw, Barry Smith, David Manley, Chris Kaposy, Father Martin Rhonheimer, Phillip Montague, Tal Brewer, Hud Hudson, James Cutsinger, Lori Gruen, Father Alfred Cioffi, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Patrick Yeung. Many of these people do not share the views expressed herein, and their help exudes the kind of charitable and intellectually just discourse this volume aims to realize. I would like especially to thank Christopher Tollefsen whose guidance on this project was indispensable.

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Contents

1 Introduction: What Are Persons? What Is Valuable? . . . . . . . . Stephen Napier Part I

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Philosophical Considerations

2 I Was Once a Fetus: That Is Why Abortion Is Wrong . . . . . . . . Alexander R. Pruss

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3 Brain Life and the Argument from Potential: Affirming the Ontological Status of Human Embryos and Fetuses . . . . . . . Jason T. Eberl and Brandon P. Brown

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4 The Human Being, a Person of Substance: A Response to Dean Stretton . . . . . . . . . . .