Philosophical Logic
With this issue we initiate the policy of expanding the scope of Tulane Studies in Philosophy to include, in addition to the work of members of the department, contributions from philosophers who have earned advanced degrees from Tulane and who are now te
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Philosophical Logic
TULANE UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS
MARTINUS NIJHOFF THE HAGUE
1967
1967
ISBN-13: 978-90-247-0290-9 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-3497-5
e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-3497-5
Copyright I967 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD: The Editor THE LOGIC OF OUR LANGUAGE: Robert
VII
L.
Arrington
PETITIO IN THE STRIFE OF SYSTEMS: Peter M. Burkholder
I
19
OBSERVATIONS ON THE USES OF ORDER: Shannon Du-
33
Bose CULTURAL RELATIVITY AND THE LOGIC OF PHILOSOPHY:
37
James W. Dye A MATERIAL THEORY OF REFERENCE: James
K.
Feible-
ON LETTING: Bertrand P. Helm
53 77
ON THE ILLOGIC OF THE MENTAL: Max O. Hocutt
93
man
ON THE USES AND INTERPRETATION OF LOGICAL SYMBOLS: Harold N. Lee
III
NOTES ON A PAST LOGIC OF TIME: Louise N. Roberts
123
THE PROBLEM OF JUDGMENT IN HUSSERL'S THOUGHT: John C. Sallis
129
LATER
PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SATISFACTION: Donald H. Weiss
153
PHILOS OPHICAL LOGIC
FOREWORD With this issue we initiate the policy of expanding the scope of Tulane Studies in Philosophy to include, in addition to the work of members of the department, contributions from philosophers who have earned advanced degrees from Tulane and who are now teaching in other colleges and universities. The Editor
THE LOGIC OF OUR LANGUAGE ROBERT L. ARRINGTON
Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus that "logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world." 1 In line with his suggestion that a proposition is a 'picture', Wittgenstein argued that propositions 'show' the logical structure of the real. He was insistent, however, that "the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one." 2 As a result of this we can misunderstand the structure of fact. Philosophical problems arise just when "the logic of our language is misunderstood." 3 It is common knowledge that much of this view of logic was rejected by Wittgenstein himself in the Philosophical Investigations. There we are told that language has no ideal or sublime logic which mirrors the structure of the extra-linguistic world. 4 Consequently, inferences from the structure of language to the structure of that extra-linguistic world are invalid. Reality can be 'cut up' in any of a number of ways by language. Wittgenstein adopted a view of philosophy which would render that discipline a non-explanatory, non-critical study of the multiple ways in which language can be used. Philosophy does not pass judgment on the adequacy of these uses nor seek to use them as ontological clues. It is to describe not the one true logic, but the logics or grammars of ordinary language - the games in which a word occurs, the linguistic and non-linguistic occasions for its use and the appropriate linguistic and non-linguistic responses to its use. 1 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness (New York: The Humanities Press, 1961), 6. 13. 2 Ibid., 4. 003I. 3 Ibid., p. 3. 4 Phi
