Plurals and Mereology
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Plurals and Mereology Salvatore Florio1
· David Nicolas2
Received: 2 August 2019 / Accepted: 5 August 2020 / © The Author(s) 2020
Abstract In linguistics, the dominant approach to the semantics of plurals appeals to mereology. However, this approach has received strong criticisms from philosophical logicians who subscribe to an alternative framework based on plural logic. In the first part of the article, we offer a precise characterization of the mereological approach and the semantic background in which the debate can be meaningfully reconstructed. In the second part, we deal with the criticisms and assess their logical, linguistic, and philosophical significance. We identify four main objections and show how each can be addressed. Finally, we compare the strengths and shortcomings of the mereological approach and plural logic. Our conclusion is that the former remains a viable and well-motivated framework for the analysis of plurals. Keywords Mass nouns · Mereology · Model theory · Natural language semantics · Ontological commitment · Plural logic · Plurals · Russell’s paradox · Truth theory
1 Introduction A prominent tradition in linguistic semantics analyzes plurals by appealing to mereology (e.g. Link [40, 41], Landman [32, 34], Gillon [20], Moltmann [50], Krifka [30], Bale and Barner [2], Chierchia [12], Sutton and Filip [76], and Champollion [9]).1
1 The historical roots of this tradition include Leonard and Goodman [38], Goodman and Quine [22], Massey [46], and Sharvy [74].
Salvatore Florio
[email protected] David Nicolas
[email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom
2
Institut Jean Nicod, D´epartement d’´etudes cognitives, ENS, EHESS, CNRS, PSL University, Paris, France
S. Florio, D. Nicolas
The mereological approach to plural semantics has received strong criticisms from philosophical logicians who subscribe to an alternative framework based on plural logic (e.g. Boolos [5], Oliver and Smiley [57, 58], Rayo [65, 66], Yi [85], and McKay [47]). Some of the criticisms target a broader class of “singularist” semantic analyses that interpret plural expressions in terms of singular ones. The mereological approach is the most popular, and perhaps the most plausible, of these analyses. These criticisms have been very influential in philosophy, providing grounds for the acceptance of plural logic in areas such as metaphysics and the philosophy of mathematics. What has been overlooked is that, once the mereological approach is properly understood, its proponents have the basic tools for responding. Our aim is to clarify what these responses can be and develop a systematical defense of this approach.2 This will help bridge the gap between the linguistic and philosophical literature. In the first part of the article, we offer a precise reconstruction of the mereological approach and its semantic background, in order to enable a more meaningful debate. We focus on the best-known implementation of the approach—that of Godehard Link—but mos
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