Towards a Relational Phenomenology of Violence
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Towards a Relational Phenomenology of Violence Michael Staudigl
Published online: 7 March 2013 The Author(s) 2013. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This article elaborates a relational phenomenology of violence. Firstly, it explores the constitution of all sense in its intrinsic relation with our embodiment and intercorporality. Secondly, it shows how this relational conception of sense and constitution paves the path for an integrative understanding of the bodily and symbolic constituents of violence. Thirdly, the author addresses the overall consequences of these reflections, thereby identifying the main characteristics of a relational phenomenology of violence. In the final part, the paper provides an exemplification of the outlined conception with regard to a concrete phenomenon of violence, i.e., slapping, and a concluding reflection upon its overall significance for research on violence. Keywords Phenomenology Violence Embodiment Symbolicity Experience Relationality Slapping ‘‘[O]ne uses violence with little scruple, since it is said to be inscribed in things’’. (Merleau-Ponty 1973: 93).
Introduction: Violence and Sense Two main obstructions tend to hamper research on violence. The first revolves around the concept of violence and the danger posed by an essentialization of the phenomenon that is determinative of its sense, that is, it views violence exclusively in terms of response (as counter-violence), resource (as an instrument), or structural or pathological predispositions (Wieviorka 2003: 42f.). The second obstacle consists of the opposite view, namely to deem violence that escapes these patterns of M. Staudigl (&) Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Universita¨tsstraße 7 (NIG), 1010 Vienna, Austria e-mail: [email protected]
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interpretation senseless (see Best 2000; critically Blok 2000; Mamdani 2004: 3f.); and it is exactly this view that quickly leads to an all too violent sidelining. In my view, these two problems overlap in a deeply problematic understanding of the relationship between violence and sense that reduces violence to an instrumental action of a ‘‘strong subject’’ but largely overlooks its silently functioning poietics and socio-technological dimensions. This relationship has indeed been neglected all too often in favor of an analysis of the causes of violence—be it sociological, psychological or anthropological.1 While such analyses were carried out based on a seemingly consolidated idea of what violence is—that is, ‘‘the deliberate infliction of bodily harm’’—such a definition fails to take into account how violence is experienced; the ‘‘sense’’ of it according to its ‘‘protagonists’’. In response to such a reductive approach, it has recently been suggested that a theory of violence be developed that puts the subject at its center.2 Subject-centric approaches indeed tend to examine the experience of a ‘‘loss of sense,’’ as undergone by the recipient of violence (see Mensch 2009: 72–80, D
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