The strong emergence of molecular structure
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The strong emergence of molecular structure Vanessa A. Seifert 1 Received: 12 March 2019 / Accepted: 30 August 2020 / Published online: 1 October 2020 # The Author(s) 2020
Abstract One of the most plausible and widely discussed examples of strong emergence is molecular structure. The only detailed account of it, which has been very influential, is due to Robin Hendry and is formulated in terms of downward causation. This paper explains Hendry’s account of the strong emergence of molecular structure and argues that it is coherent only if one assumes a diachronic reflexive notion of downward causation. However, in the context of this notion of downward causation, the strong emergence of molecular structure faces three challenges that have not been met and which have so far remained unnoticed. First, the putative empirical evidence presented for the strong emergence of molecular structure equally undermines supervenience, which is one of the main tenets of strong emergence. Secondly, it is ambiguous how the assumption of determinate nuclear positions is invoked for the support of strong emergence, as the role of this assumption in Hendry’s argument can be interpreted in more than one way. Lastly, there are understandings of causation which render the postulation of a downward causal relation between a molecule’s structure and its quantum mechanical entities, untenable. Keywords Strong emergence . Molecular structure . Downward causation
1 Introduction Emergence is a topic which raises heated debates in philosophy. The term ‘emergence’ is used in philosophy of science in order to describe a relation either between scientific theories, descriptions, or representations (this is usually labelled ‘epistemic’ or ‘weak’ emergence), or between entities, properties, etc. that occupy at least partially distinct
* Vanessa A. Seifert [email protected]
1
University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
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European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 45
levels or scales of ontology (this is usually labelled ‘ontological’, ‘metaphysical’, or ‘strong’ emergence).1 While the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical emergence is to an extent accepted in the literature, any further attempt to specify emergence falls short of wide agreement.2 There are various disputes about how to formulate emergence in the literature. For example, philosophical accounts often specify emergence by reference to sets of terms that are at least partially distinct (for example Silberstein 2002: 90–92; Humphreys 2016: 38–39; Wilson 2015: 364–372). This makes it difficult to compare alternative accounts of emergence (Kim 2006: 548). Another disagreement lies in the specification of the relata that participate in the emergent relation. For example, regarding metaphysical emergence, philosophers speak of emergence between parts and wholes, properties, events and processes, causal capacities, laws, entities (Silberstein 2002: 90), features (Wilson 2015: 373), or phenomena (Batterman 2011: 1031). Most commonly, philosophers
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