In Defence of Rationalist Accounts of the Continental Drift Debate: A Response to Pellegrini
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In Defence of Rationalist Accounts of the Continental Drift Debate: A Response to Pellegrini Erik Weber1 · Dunja Šešelja2
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract This paper is a reaction to ‘Styles of Thought on the Continental Drift Debate’ by Pablo Pellegrini, published in this journal. The author argues that rationalist accounts of the continental drift debate fail because they overlook important issues. In this discussion we distinguish various forms of rationalism. Then we present a sophisticated rationalist account of the continental drift debate and argue that it is satisfactory because it explains all the central developments in that debate. Finally, we point to a problematic tension in Pellegrini’s paper and unravel an underlying ambiguity. Keywords Alfred Wegener · Continental drift · Empirical evidence · Rationalist accounts of science · Pablo Pellegrini
1 Introduction This paper is a reaction to ‘Styles of Thought on the Continental Drift Debate’ by Pablo Pellegrini, published in this journal (Pellegrini 2019). The author argues that rationalist accounts of the continental drift debate fail because they overlook important issues (p. 87). Our first aim in this paper is to present a sophisticated rationalist account of the continental drift debate that is adequate and that does not overlook any important issues. Our second aim is to show that Pellegrini’s argument fails because he does not distinguish the crude empiricist variant of rationalism from more sophisticated variants. We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we discuss various forms of rationalism and identify the type that we adhere to. In Section 3 we provide relevant background information about continental drift theories. Then we present a sophisticated rationalist account of the continental drift debate and argue that it is satisfactory because it explains all the central developments in that debate (Sect. 4). Finally, we switch to our second aim. We point to a
* Erik Weber [email protected] Dunja Šešelja [email protected] 1
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
2
Philosophy and Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
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E. Weber, D. Šešelja
problematic tension in Pellegrini’s paper (Sect. 5.1) and unravel an underlying ambiguity (Sect. 5.2).
2 Varieties of Rationalism 2.1 Ian Hacking’s Characterisation of Rationalism In his book The Social Construction of What? Ian Hacking characterises a rationalist as someone who “favors internal understandings of what knowledge is” (1999, 92). He clarifies this as follows: Rationalists think that most science proceeds as it does in the light of the good reasons produced by research. Some bodies of knowledge become stable because of the wealth of good theoretical and experimental reasons that can be adduced for them. Constructivists think that reasons are not decisive for the course of science (1999, 91). […] The constructionist holds that explanations for the stability of scientific belief involve, at
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