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Ontological Emergence Without Vertical Causation Soo Lam Wong1 Received: 20 May 2019 / Accepted: 24 December 2019 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020

Abstract In this essay, I aim to address the two related problems faced by ontological emergence and propose a solution. First, I shall briefly outline the concept of emergence, the distinction between ontological and epistemological emergence, as well as the distinction between synchronic and diachronic emergence, and focus mainly on synchronic ontological emergence. Second, I shall discuss the two related problems faced by synchronic ontological emergence—configurational forces and downward causation. Third, I shall present a solution to these problems—affirming ontological emergence but denying vertical causation. Last, I shall address objections to the ontological emergence without vertical causation view. Keywords  Emergence · Ontological · Synchronic · Configurational forces · Downward causation

1 Introduction Emergence is the idea that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, ontologically or epistemologically. Advocates of ontological emergence typically affirm the realism of emergent properties which possess configurational forces and exert downward causal power over the basal entities they emerge from, whereas advocates of epistemological emergence typically deny the realism of such emergent properties and instead affirm that such emergent properties are no more than emergent patterns of basal entities which require emergent explanations as emergent patterns cannot be adequately accounted for in basal explanations. A distinction can also be made between synchronic emergence or diachronic emergence. While synchronic emergence examines the relationship between emergent properties and basal entities at any one time, diachronic emergence examines the same relationship across time. My aim in this essay is to argue for a version of ontological emergence that denies vertical causation. First, I shall * Soo Lam Wong [email protected] 1



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briefly outline the distinctions between ontological and epistemological emergence, as well as between synchronic and diachronic emergence, and focus on synchronic ontological emergence. Second, I shall discuss the two related problems faced by synchronic ontological emergence—configurational forces and downward causation—as espoused by Brian McLaughlin and Jaegwon Kim respectively. Third, I shall present a solution to these problems through affirming ontological emergence but denying vertical causation, drawing on the works of C.B. Martin and John Heil. Last, I shall address objections to the ontological emergence without vertical causation view.

2 Two Kinds of Emergence: Ontological and Epistemological Van Gulik (2001) distinguishes between epistemological emergence and ontological emergence by specifying the sort of factors that figure in emergence relations. Epistemolo