Action Control From Cognition to Behavior
"It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical." This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more t
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Series in Social
Psychology
SSSP Action Control From Cognition to Behavior Edited by Julius Kuhl and Jiirgen Beckmann
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg New York Tokyo
PD Dr. Julius KuhI Dr. Jurgen Beckmann Max-Planck-Institut fur psychologische Forschung Leopoldstrasse 24, D-8000 Munchen 40, F. R. Germany
With 19 Figures
ISBN-I3: 978-3-642-69748-7 e-ISBN-13: 978-3-642-69746-3 001: 10.1007/978-3-642-69746-3 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically those of translation, reprinting, re-use of illustrations, broadcasting, reproduction by photocopying machine or similar means, and storage in data banks. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law, where copies are made for other than private use, a fee is payable to 'Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort', Munich. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1985
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1985 The use of registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Typesetting, printing and binding: G.Appl, Wemding 2126/3140-543210
To Martha, who is well acquainted with the limits of action control
Preface
"It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical." This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psychologists. For more than 40 years theories of human action have assumed that cognition and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism, social learning theory, consistency theories , and expectancyvalue theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common : they all assume that "thought (or any other type of cognition) can move anything," that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities involved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do . Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions, and the enactment of the behavior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the maintenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies. Recently, many investigators from several subfields of psychology have discovered cognition-behavior inconsistencies. This led to several studies of the various factors contributing to observed discrepancies between cognition and behavior. Social psychologists have studied attitude-behav
