The Role of Mental Powers in Panpsychism
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The Role of Mental Powers in Panpsychism Fabian Klinge1,2
© Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract Constitutive Russellian panpsychism seems to combine the strengths of its rivals, physicalism and dualism, while avoiding their weaknesses: by acknowledging the irreducibility of phenomenal properties yet grounding macro- in microphenomenality (phenomenal constitution), the view can avoid both anti-physicalist arguments and the causal exclusion problem for dualism. However, two severe objections have been raised: the combination problem for phenomenal constitution, and the structural exclusion problem for the position’s account of microphenomenal causation. It is currently hotly debated whether the combination problem can be overcome. If not, panpsychists are forced to view macrophenomenality as emergent. Yet emergent panpsychism is subject to the causal exclusion problem, thereby sacrificing panpsychism’s advantage over dualism. With regard to the structural exclusion problem, Mørch (forthcoming) provides a solution in terms of microphenomenal powers. I argue that Mørch’s view is not tenable. This notwithstanding, I develop a modification of her view which can solve the structural exclusion problem. Moreover, the emergentist version of this approach can avoid the causal exclusion problem. Thus, I aim to provide both a satisfying account of microphenomenal causation in panpsychism and a viable version of emergent panpsychism in case the combination problem turns out to be unsolvable. Keywords Mental powers · Panpsychism · Causal exclusion · Mental causation · Emergence · Consciousness
1 Introduction Panpsychism is the view that, besides higher animals, at least some entities on the fundamental ontological level are conscious. That is, some or even all elementary particles exhibit phenomenal states (or qualia) which are experienced by microsubjects. The view’s most parsimonious version is constitutive panpsychism, according to which animal-level macrophenomenality is ‘nothing-over-and-above’ or ‘grounded in/derivative from’ quantum-level microphenomenality.1 One variant, constitutive Russellian panpsychism, has attracted considerable attention in the last few years, since it appears to combine the strengths of its rivals, physicalism and dualism, while avoiding their weaknesses. Like dualism, it acknowledges the irreducibility of phenomenal properties, thus avoiding objections to physicalism such as the conceivability argument. Like physicalism, it does not
* Fabian Klinge [email protected] 1
University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
Tübingen, Germany
2
invoke mental downward causation, thus avoiding the core objection to dualism, the causal exclusion argument. Avoidance of downward causation is accomplished in two consecutive steps. First, according to Russellianism, microphenomenal properties act as realizers of microphysical dispositions, thereby exhibiting genuine causal efficacy. Second, according to phenomenal constitution, macrophenomenal properties are grounded in microphenomenal properties.
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